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I shall be mainly concerned with two questions: (1) What is the meaning of 
statements to the effect that someone owns something?, and (2) What is the 
basis of ownership, i.e. under what conditions does someone own something? In 
the context of this conference on the question "Who owns our genes?", one may 
wonder whether there are some "things" that cannot be owned by anyone. I guess 
the natural attitude among ordinary people would be that genes are not owned 
by anyone or, alternatively, that they belong to all of us together. In classical 
terms, a gene is either a res nullius or it is a res communes omnium. However, in 
order to justify—or discredit—such an attitude something has to be said about 
the questions (1) and (2). An answer to (2) might be sufficient, but in order to 
answer (2), a natural first step is to say something about (1). 
 
The meaning of ownership. 
So let's start with (1). It is commonly agreed that to own something, X, is to have 
certain rights and duties vis-à-vis other people or juridical persons with respect 
to X. In short, ownership is a bundle of rights and duties. For example, if you own 
a car, you have the right to drive it (provided you have a driver's license), the 
right to prevent others from using it, the right to sell it or to give it away, the 
duty to pay an owner's tax, and the duty to see to it that it satisfies certain 
safety regulations; moreover, the car is liable to execution for any debt or 
insolvency that you might have, and so on.  However, we can hardly maintain 
that this is what we mean when we say that you own a car. For one thing, most 
of us have no clear conception of exactly what rights and duties are involved in 
the ownership of a car. Secondly, other instances of ownership may involve 
different rights and duties—e.g. if you own a piece of land, you may not have the 
right to prevent others from using it (in certain ways)—but it seems odd to say 
that the very meaning of terms such as "own", "ownership", and "property" 
varies from one instance to another. If this were the case, it would be hard to 
see how we could ever learn the meaning of these terms. 
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 We might try to make a distinction between those rights and duties which are 
essentially involved in ownership and those which are only accidentally or 
contingently involved. For example, your ownership of the car involves the duty to 
pay a tax, but we can easily imagine a change in the law to the effect that car owners 
are no longer required to pay any tax just for owning a car. This suggests that this 
particular duty is only contingently involved in ownership. By contrast, we might try 
find some rights and duties which are necessarily involved in all cases of ownership; 
these could then be taken to define ownership. But what could these rights and 
duties be? Consider, for example, the rights to use X and to sell it. I have those rights 
with respect to my apartment in Stockholm, but I do not own my apartment; it is 
owned by an association (bostadsrättsförening) of which I am a member. Again, I 
may own a car even though I lack the rights to use it and to sell it, for it may be 
taken to execution for some debt of mine. In short, there are probably no rights or 
duties which are essentially involved in all cases of ownership. 
 Rather, it seems that the terms "own", "ownership", and "property" do not 
have a very clear meaning in ordinary language; they are at least vague, and 
possibly also ambiguous. They can hardly be defined by conditions which are 
both necessary and sufficient for ownership. Instead, we probably learn them by 
being introduced to certain fairly simple examples, in the case of which certain 
important rights and duties are indicated without any claim to exactness or 
completeness. My example above, in which you own a car, is an example of 
this kind. After a few examples, we see a certain similarity even if we cannot 
state it in precise terms. Roughly speaking, then, we come to see that a person 
owns something in so far as he or she has certain rights and duties of the kind 
exemplified in examples of this kind. This is surely vague, but that is not a 
serious problem. Lots of words in our ordinary language are learnt in a similar 
way and they are also vague in a similar way. 
 
Three levels of analysis. 
However, a further point should be made about the meaning of terms like 
"ownership" and "property". They share a certain systematic ambiguity with 
the related terms "rights" and "duties" or "liabilities". The latter terms may be 
taken either in a factual or in a normative sense. Consequently, and similarly, 
if we say that someone owns something, this statement may be either factual or 
normative. In the first case, what is meant is that the person in question has 
certain rights and liabilities according to a certain legal system (e.g. the legal 
system of the country of which he or she is a citizen). In other words, on this 
interpretation, the statement that someone owns something is elliptic and states 
a fact about a legal system. For example, it seems to be a fact that the 
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American company Myriad Genetics now owns the world patent for two genes 
that cause breast cancer, namely BRCA 1 and BRCA 2. This is so whether we like 
it or not, and whether or not it is a desirable state of the world that genes can be 
owned in this way. 
 By contrast, on the normative interpretation, the statement that someone 
owns something does not (merely) describe a matter of fact. It does not say 
anything about the way the world is; rather, it says something about the way things 
ought to be. Moreover, there is a certain principle, usually associated with David 
Hume and very widely accepted, according to which there is a logical gap between 
"is" and "ought"; this means that from premisses about the way the world is nothing 
can be derived about the way things ought to be. In other words, normative (or 
normatively legitimate) ownership is logically quite independent of factual 
ownership. 
 The distinction between factual and normative ownership is perhaps fairly clear in 
theory. However, it may not be so clear in practice. In particular, many statements to 
the effect that somebody owns something may have both factual and normative 
content. (To a certain extent, this is quite trivial. If I make the normative statement 
that Jones ought to have a certain bundle of rights, I thereby imply that Jones 
exists—which is a factual statement. But what I now have in mind is less trivial.) A 
legal system may not be complete in the sense that it settles every question of 
ownership in a purely mechanical or algorithmic way. The rules which make up a 
legal system may leave room for different decisions in particular cases. Moreover, it 
may also be possible to interpret and reinterpret the rules in different ways in 
accordance with different principles which are more or less implicit in the system. 
Therefore, judges may often have to weigh different considerations against one 
another, and in such cases competent judges may differ as to what is the correct 
answer. Moreover, there may be no clear distinction between the view that the 
"correct" answer is actually implicit in the system and the view that it corresponds to 
the way the system ought to be interpreted and applied. A supreme court may of 
course settle cases of this kind, but before its decision is taken different members of 
the court may differ about what the law says. Maybe their statements should be 
regarded as both factual and normative—or as something in between. And maybe 
the same is true of the court's decision. Maybe it can even be held that all legal 
decisions have this mixed character. 
 If this is so, we may still uphold the distinction between factual and normative 
statements. Philosophers who accept this distinction would probably say that, by 
definition, mixed statements are to be classified as normative. The normative 
element is dominant, as it were. Consequently, statements about ownership that are 
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internal to a legal system are normative. On the other hand, external statements, i.e. 
statements which are about the internal statements of a legal system, are factual. 
Hence, if a judge decides, in his official capacity, that Jones is the owner of a certain 
piece of land, then his statement is normative. On the other hand, if I say that Jones 
is the owner, my statement could be understood as an external and factual statement 
about the legal system to which Jones belongs. Roughly speaking, I am claiming, 
subjunctively, that if the question were put to the relevant court in that legal system, 
it would decide (normatively) that Jones is the owner. 
 Now, the question "Who owns our genes?" might be understood in at least three 
different ways. First, it may be taken as an internal and partly normative question 
which might be raised within a given legal system, a question for judges to answer. 
Second, it may be taken as an external and factual question about some particular 
legal system, a question which might be answered by legal theorists or by social 
scientists from some other discipline (like sociology or anthropology). Third, 
however, it may also be interpreted as a normative and political question concerning 
what would follow from a normatively correct or justifiable legal system. The third 
question is different from the first in that it is independent of any already established 
system of rules and legal decisions. 
 It seems to me that these three directions of interpretation should be clearly 
distinguished. We may label them the internal, the external, and the political. They 
may be regarded as three different levels of analysis. 
 
The basis of ownership. 
Let's now move to question (2), concerning the legitimate basis of ownership. 
This question is sometimes discussed under the heading "theories of 
ownership". However, it seems that here, too, we need to distinguish among the 
three levels of analysis just described. On the internal interpretation the question is 
raised within some given legal system, and it may be answered in different ways 
within different systems. This is a question for judges. On the external interpretation, 
we ask what is regarded as the basis of ownership within a given system or set of 
systems. This is a question for social scientists. In this paper, I am not concerned 
with actually existing legal systems, either internally or externally. So let me pass on 
to the third interpretation.  
 On the political interpretation, we ask what ought to be the basis of ownership. 
This is a question for politicians—and also, more generally, for philosophers. This is 
the question I shall be concerned with. It might be formulated as follows: What are 
the conditions that should be satisfied by a normatively acceptable legal system of 
ownership? More precisely, what are the conditions which must be fulfilled, 
according to such a system, in order for a person to own something? A closely 
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related, preliminary question is the following: Does ownership only exist within 
some legal system or is it possible to own something outside of all legal systems?  
 It might be held—and it seems to have been held by Jeremy Bentham, for one—
that there is no property where there is no legal system. Of course, there are no legal 
rights and duties (and therefore no legal ownership) if there is no legal system. But 
perhaps there are so-called natural (or moral) rights and duties whether or not there 
exists a positive legal system, and maybe such natural rights and duties can 
constitute property in a moral (non-legal) sense.  
 However, it is hard to imagine a society in which there is no legal system at all. 
As long as a number of people interact, there will probably arise certain conventions 
which regulate their actions and attitudes. These conventions may be regarded as a 
legal system, even if it is a comparatively undeveloped one. In fact, there may be no 
clear distinction between a "legal" system in this wide sense and the "moral" system 
of a given society. Some conventions, at least, may be regarded as either legal or 
moral or both. But in any case, the conventions adopted by a society—whether or 
not they are best described as "moral" conventions—are not necessarily morally 
acceptable. Consequently, there may still be a distinction between legal ownership 
and moral ownership, where the latter is independent of the rules and conventions of 
existing societies.  
 
Three theories of ownership. 
It may be useful to consider three different views concerning the basis of ownership: 
the Lockean, the utilitarian, and the contractualist.  
 According to the Lockean view, as developed e.g. by John Locke and, in a 
contemporary version, by Robert Nozick, everyone owns his or her own person and 
body and the labour produced by it, and therefore everyone also owns those objects 
with which he or she "mixes" his or her labour, at least insofar as there is "enough 
and as good left in common for others". Moreover, one can transfer (parts of) what 
one owns to others, in which case what is transferred is then owned by those to 
whom it is transferred. For example, if I cultivate a piece of land, which is not 
owned by anyone else, I mix my labour with it and therefore come to own it. I also 
own the corn which I grow on my piece of land. In general, I own the fruits of my 
labour and that which has been transferred to me by others.  
 The utilitarian view of ownership goes somewhat as follows. A legal system 
should be devised in such a way as to satisfy the utilitarian criterion of rightness; i.e. 
it should maximize the overall welfare of all sentient beings. Ownership is defined 
by legal systems. Consequently, according to the utilitarian view, morally acceptable 
ownership is ownership as defined by a legal system that satisfies the utilitarian 
criterion. Jeremy Bentham and David Hume are well-known proponents of this 
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view, and I have the impression that it is also accepted by some philosophers and 
legal theorists today. 
 However, we should perhaps distinguish between an unrestricted and a restricted 
version of the utilitarian view. According to the former, the relevant consideration 
for the evaluation of a legal system is the welfare of every sentient being; according 
to the latter, the relevant welfare is only that of the people within the jurisdiction of 
the legal system in question. Strictly speaking, the restricted view is not really 
utilitarian at all. But it is still consequentialist: what matters are the consequences of 
adopting and applying the legal system in question. 
 The contractualist view can be developed in various ways. The most well-known 
form of contractualism in modern times is that developed by John Rawls. (However, 
Rawls himself does not discuss property; the terms "property" and "ownership" do 
not occur in the index of his main book, A Theory of Justice, and none of its 87 
sections is devoted to this topic.) Roughly speaking, contractualism says that a legal 
system (or a basic constitution) is morally acceptable or just if it would be agreed 
upon, behind a veil of ignorance, by the people who are to live with it. The veil of 
ignorance means that the parties to the agreement (contract) do not know what their 
individual circumstances and individual characteristics are. They are supposed to 
have only general social and psychological knowledge. Their particular conceptions 
of the good are also removed; the parties are supposed to be purely self-interested 
and fully rational. These restrictions mean that personal biases and particular 
bargaining positions cannot influence the agreement—which will therefore be a fair 
one. Similarly, a system of property rules will be fair, and morally acceptable, if it 
can be agreed upon behind a veil of ignorance or, alternatively, if it is the outcome 
of process of legislation in accordance with a constitution that in turn satisfies the 
contractualist criterion. 
 
Some problems. 
Each of the three theories of ownership mentioned here may have a certain initial 
plausibility. However, it is fairly easy to see that each of them gives rise to rather 
serious difficulties. Let me now try to say something about the main problems with 
each of them. 
 There are several more or less well-known problems with the Lockean view. First, 
it is somewhat dogmatic. It starts with the assumption that everyone owns his or her 
own person and body. But why should we accept this? It is far from self-evident. 
Why should we not assume, rather, that nobody (not even the person in question) can 
own a person or a person's body? From a purely intuitive point of view, this is surely 
at least equally plausible. It would also explain the wide-spread conviction that no 
one is entitled to sell or give away himself or herself.  
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 Second, even if everyone should own his or her own person and body, it does not 
automatically follow that everyone also owns the fruits of his or her labour, nor that 
one has the right to transfer such fruits to others as one wishes. In this connection, it 
should be noticed that "the fruits of one's labour" are usually dependent upon other 
people's labour as well. When I produce something, I may need raw materials, 
special components, tools, capital, and technological know-how which are usually 
produced by others. It is hard to decide how much, and what parts, of what I produce 
that should be attributed to me rather than others.  
 Third, the Lockean view is much too vague for practical purposes; it is not much 
help in hard cases. For example, it does not seem to give any clear guidance 
concerning the question of who owns our genes. Genes may be regarded as parts of 
our bodies, but they do not belong to any particular body; different people may have 
the same genes in varying degrees. Should we say that the breast cancer gene BRCA 
1 belongs to each person who has that gene? Or does it belong to all of these people 
collectively? BRCA 1 itself is hardly the fruit of anyone's labour, but the knowledge 
that BRCA 1 causes breast cancer is perhaps such a fruit. Does the Lockean view 
imply that this knowledge can be owned (and sold, etc.)? If so, should the ownership 
be distributed among all those scientists who have somehow contributed to the 
research process which has led to this piece of knowledge? If so, how should the 
ownership be distributed? In proportion to the contribution? If so, a legal (or moral) 
decision would presuppose a lot of difficult research in the history of science. This is 
hardly realistic. But it also seems rather unfair to say that whoever published the 
actual result is the sole owner. In any case, even if the Lockean view should tell us 
who the owner is, it does not tell us exactly what rights and duties are involved in 
this particular case of ownership. 
 The utilitarian view of property is perhaps less arbitrary and more intuitively 
plausible than the Lockean view. Theoretically, it also settles more questions, for 
example questions about what the relevant rights and duties are. However, four 
points should be noticed about the utilitarian view, whether it is restricted or 
unrestricted.   
 First, according to the utilitarian view we can never know whether a person owns 
a certain object. This is so because the total consequences of (applying) a given legal 
system can never be calculated with any certainty. Moreover, there is no way we can 
list all possible legal systems, nor can we pick out any subset of these which we 
know are better than the rest. Consequently, we can never know that the 
consequences of one legal system are better than (or at least as good as) those of 
every alternative legal system. This greatly reduces the practical value of the 
utilitarian view of ownership. In practice, we may at best make very rough and 
uncertain utilitarian evaluations of possible revisions of a given legal system. This 
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may be worthwhile, but it is not really what is required to settle questions of moral 
ownership. 
 Second, the utilitarian view leaves open the possibility that more than one legal 
system is morally acceptable, since more than one system may maximize welfare. In 
such cases, the utilitarian view yields contradictions: a person may both own and not 
own a certain object, since he owns it according to one optimal system but not 
according to another. This is unacceptable. Perhaps this possibility would never be 
realized in practice. Still, it is theoretically awkward.  
 Third, according to the utilitarian view quite different legal systems may be 
morally acceptable in different places and at different times. A legal system that 
would maximize (general or local) welfare if it were applied in a given country at a 
given time may not do so if it were applied in a different country or at a different 
time. Consequently, from a utilitarian point of view, the correct answer to the 
question "Who owns our genes?" may very well vary from one time and place to 
another. Of course, the answer to this question may vary because the law is applied 
to different circumstances. But such a variation is not what I have in mind here. The 
point is rather that the (ideal) law itself may vary from time to time and from place 
to place. However, this is no objection to the utilitarian view. 
 Fourth, there remains the problem of how to delimit the relevant population, the 
welfare of which is to be maximized according to the utilitarian view. According to 
classical utilitarianism, each sentient being from here to eternity should be included, 
but this idea is probably not what most actual legislators have in mind. On the other 
hand, it would probably be regarded as too restrictive to include only the 
contemporary human population of a given national territory.   
 The contractualist view is intuitively attractive, but it is not easy to determine 
what it implies in practice. The following points should be noticed. 
 First, as Rawls himself points out, the contract agreed upon in a hypothetical 
contract situation depends upon how the contract situation is defined and, in 
particular, upon what beliefs, desires, and other psychological traits the parties to the 
contract are supposed to have. Consequently, nothing in particular can be derived 
concerning property rights and duties until these matters are fixed. And it is not clear 
how they ought to be fixed. To some extent, this depends upon what the contract 
would be under different assumptions. (There is a kind of circle here, but it is 
probably not a vicious one. It is openly acknowledged by Rawls.) 
 Second, the parties to the contract may concentrate upon a basic constitution and 
leave questions concerning the precise rules of ownership to future legislation. If so, 
they will probably decide that legislation must be governed by the constitution and 
that the constitution should be a democratic one. Consequently, the rights and duties 
of ownership in various areas will eventually emerge as a result of democratic 
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decision-making. But democratic decision-making is not completely determined by 
constitutional rules; other factors, such as technological development, class 
structure, cultural biases, and individual psychological facts about the decision-
makers will also influence the outcome. Therefore, it cannot be known in advance 
what the rules of ownership would be.  
 Third, if the hypothetical contract already contains an explicit principle for 
evaluating property rules, the outcome depends upon what this principle is. Given 
certain assumptions about the parties to the contract, it might be plausible to assume 
that they would agree on (some version of) the utilitarian criterion. If so, the 
considerations mentioned above concerning the utilitarian view apply here as well. 
Another possibility is that they would choose the Lockean principles of ownership. 
The parties are taken to be rational agents and the Lockean principles are usually 
supposed to be discernible by reason; this seems to imply that the parties would 
choose those very principles. This would lead us back to the problems already 
indicated.  
 In conclusion, we can say that it is very hard indeed to settle political and moral 
problems of ownership in a principled way. In particular, if we abstract from 
actually existing legal systems, it is very much an open question who owns our 
genes. This may not come as a surprise—except, possibly, to those who believe that 
there also exists a determinate system of natural law. 
  
